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In 2014, the Census Bureau reported that of the twenty million
children, under the age of five, living in the United States, 50.2%
were minorities. 1 For those who feared that White Americans would
soon become the minority, recent data reveals that the day has already come, and by 2020, more than half of America's children under
the age of eighteen will be members of a racial minority or ethnic
group. 2 However, despite the country's increasing racial diversity,
our society's preference for Eurocentric standards ofbeauty remains
the same. 3
"Eurocentric'' standards of beauty refer to the bias shown towards European or Caucasian culture and the physical traits associated with it. 4 Furthermore, as the United States is seen as one of
the most powerful countries in the world, our standard of beauty
has seeped into other countries as a result of globalization, influencing the way other cultures define beauty. 5 For example, preference
1. Noor Wazwaz, It's OfficiaL· The U.S. is Becoming a Minority-Majority Nation,
U.S. NEWS (JulyS, 2015, 5:14PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/07/06/its
·offi.cial-the-us-is-becoming-a-minority-majority-nation [https://penna.cc/8NKZ-Z57M].
2. Id.
3. See Franchesca Ramsey, Here's the Major Problem with White Beauty Standards,
EVERYDAY FE:MINISM (July 17, 2016), https://everydayfeminism.com/2016/07/white-beauty
-standards [https://perma.cc/BN4Z-WTD5].
4. Gabriella Tranchina, Eurocentric Beauty Standards: A Global Disease, GERM
MAG. (June 15, 2015), http:/lwww.germmagazine.com/eurocentric-beauty-standards-a
-global-disease [https://perma.cc/F4BS-NRKP].
5. ld.
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for lighter skin remains prevalent in Asian culture.6 Historically, fair
skin was considered a symbol of wealth, separating upper-class individuals from the working class who typically labored outdoors and
had darker skin. 7 Today, in certain parts of Asia, many women use
skin-whitening creams and avoid walking outside in the sun to keep
their skin as close to white as possible. 8 Double eyelid surgery has
also become a popular practice in some Asian countries for people
who want to change their epicanthic fold, a trait common to Asians,
to be in conformity with Eurocentric standards ofbeauty.9
The issue with using whiteness as a yardstick for measuring
one's beauty is that it reinforces a system ofwhite supremacy. 10 Based
on this standard, White people, by definition, are the most attractive, and anyone who deviates from it is considered less attractive or
ugly. 11 The popular saying, ''beauty is in the eye of the beholder,"
implies that the concept of beauty is entirely subjective. 12 In our
culture, the beholder is the media, advertising companies, and the
fashion and beauty industries, whose opinions and representations
ofbeauty our society has, by and large, adopted. 13
For instance, white standards ofbeauty are visible in the entertainment industry, where most of the women who appear in major
Hollywood films are exclusively White. 14 Moreover, the range of Black
representation on the big screen is so limited that someone who has
never stepped foot in the United States could reasonably assume
that the vast majority of Black women in America are light skinned,
which is obviously untrue. 15 Likewise, the fashion industry lacks
6. Roger Pe, Yes, Asia is Obsessed with White Skin, INQUIRER.NET (Oct. 1, 2016, 5:25
AM), http:/lbusiness.inquirer.net/215898/yes-asia-is-obsessed-with-white-sk:in [https:/1
perma.cc!QQ2E-592V].
7. Id.
8 . Tranchina, supra note 4.
9 . Id.
10. Lisa Wade, When Whiteness is the Standard ofBeauty, Soc'YPAGES (May 16, 2014),
https://thesocietypages.org/socimages/2014/05/16/white-as-beautiful-black-as-white
[https://perma.cc/8CK4-JTJL].
11. Id.
12. Elizabeth Aura McClintock, Is Beauty in the Eye of the Beholder?, PSYCHOL. TODAY
(Mar. 19, 20 14), https://www.psychologytoday.com/uslblog/it-s-man-s-and-woman-s-world
/201403/is-beauty-in-the-eye-the-beholder [https://perma.cc/CX4J-39J7].
13. Maisha Z. Johnson, 10 Ways the Beauty Industry Tells You Being Beautiful
Means Being White, EVERYDAY FEMINISM (Jan. 3, 2016), https://everydayfeminism.com
/2016/0 1/when-beauty-equals-white [https://perma.cc/H4C9-5FKB].
14. See id.; see also Patrick Ryan, #OscarsSoWhite controversy: What you need to
know, USA TODAY (Feb. 2, 2016, 9:22AM), https:/lwww.usatoday.com/storyllife/movies
/2016/02/02/oscars-academy-award-nominations-diversity/79645542 [https://perma.cc
/N44Y-W9EG].
15. Tiffany Onyejiaka, Hollywood's Colorism Problem Can't Be Ignored Any Longer,
TEEN VOGUE (Aug. 22, 2017, 1:34PM), https:/lwww.teenvogue.com/story/hollywoods-col
orism-problem-cant-be-ignored [https://perma.cc/6K7M-SFUC].
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racial diversity. 16 In 2014,82.7% of the models in New York's Fashion Week-arguably the world's biggest fashion event-were White. 17
Women of color are also under-represented in most product and
commercial advertisements, even when the product being marketed
is intended for a minority audience. 18
In addition to valuing whiteness, Eurocentric standards ofbeauty
normalize having long, straight hair. 19 In his Note on the State of
Virginia, Thomas Jefferson mentions "flowing hair," in addition to,
"a more elegant symmetry of form" when describing the superior
beauty ofWhites while relegating Black people to orangutans.20 And
while there is nothing wrong with fitting the norm, the consequences
suffered by women who do not are damaging, specifically for women
of color.21 Black women are especially vulnerable to the effects of
Eurocentric beauty standards because these standards emphasize
skin tones and hair types that exclude most Black women. 22
Most recently, Amara La Negra, an Afro-Latina cast member on
VHl's Love & Hip Hop Miami, made headlines after shutting down
music producer Young Hollywood, after he insulted her natural hair,
insinuating that it would keep her from succeeding as an artist because Mros are not "elegant'' or "breathtaking ."23 Young Hollywood's
comments highlight only some of the common stereotypes and microaggressions Black women endure as a result of choosing to wear
their hair naturally. He mockingly called her "soul sista" and "Nutella
queen," causing her to walk out of the studio.24 Later, in her confessional, the singer said in response to his comments, "I don't want to
16. Alexandra Steigrad, Naomi Campbell Blasts Fashion Industry for Lack of
Diversity (Again), WoMEN'S WEAR DAILY (Feb. 8, 2011), http://wwd.com/business-news
/media/naomi-ca.mpbell-blasts-fashion-industry-for-lack-of-diversity-again-10781335-107
81335 [https://perma.cc/Q7UX-UGWY].
17. Johnson, supra note 13.
18. See id.; Lisa Marie Segarra, SheaMoistureApologizes for, Pulls Controversial Ad:
'We Really F--ked This One Up', PEOPLE (Apr. 25, 2017, 11:36 AM), https://people.com
/style/shea-moisture-pulls-controversial-ad [https://perma.cc/HB8T-PFKE].
19. Imani Gandy, Black Hair Discrimination Is Real-But Is It Against the Law?,
REWIRE.NEWS (Apr. 17, 2017, 4:58PM), https://rewire.news/ablc/2017/04/17/black-hair
-discrimination-real-but-is-it-against-law/ [https://perma.cc/26K6-MJKR].
20. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, Query XIV (1787).
21. Susan L. Bryant, The Beauty Ideal: The Effects ofEuropean Standards ofBeauty
on Black Women, 4 COLUM. Soc. WoRK REv. 80, 80 (2013).
22. Id.
23. See Moriba Cummings, Twitter Drags Young Hollywood to Hell for Racist Comments Against Amara La Negra in 'L&HH Miami' Premiere, BET (Jan. 2, 2018), https://
www.bet.com/celebrities/news/20 18101/02/love-hip-hop-miami.html [https://perma.cc/5H
UF-WL9Y]; see also Cheky, Amara La Negra Responds to Blackface Rumors After 'Love
& Hip-Hop' Premiere (Jan. 5, 2018, 3:14PM), http://remezcla.com/musidamara-la-negra
-love-and-hip-hop-blackface-rumors [https://perma.cc/J3A5-2CWY].
24. Cummings, supra note 23.
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fit 'the box,' I want to be Amara La Negra, and I'm not going to change
that for anybody else."25
Likewise, in light of the recent "explosion" of the natural hair
movement, some Black women have decided to quit using chemical
relaxers, and are learning to love and embrace their hair in its
natural state. 26 Others remain on the fence in the natural versus
straightened-hair debate, as the wrong decision can cost them their
jobs.27 In the professional world, employers, by enforcing "workplace
grooming policies," get to make that decision for them. 28 These policies
allow employers to regulate employees' dress and appearance in order
to maintain a "professionaf' image within the company.29
Generally, the courts will respect an employer's grooming policies, so long as they serve legitimate business purposes and do not
discriminate on the basis of race, religion, or sex. 30 However, in
2016, the Eleventh Circuit upheld an employer's ban on dreadlocksa hairstyle commonly associated with Black heritage. 31 In the context of employment law, Congress has limited the definition of race
under Title VII to "immutable traits" of a person's race, excluding
cultural aspects associated with race. 32 This narrow interpretation
has left the courts to grapple with the question of what qualifies as
"race discrimination'' in employment cases, with the courts tending
to rule in favor of the employer. 33 Furthermore, the distinction made
between "immutable" biological traits and cultural aspects associated
with race, allows employers to discriminate based on an individual's
expression of their cultural identity. 34
25. Id.
26. Natural hairstyles refer to when Black women style their hair in a way that is
consistent with the hair's natural texture. Gandy, supra note 19.
27. Emma Axelrod, The Effect of "Beauty" Standards in Professional America, BROWN
PoL. REV. (Nov. 2, 2014), http://www.brownpoliticalreview.org/20 14/111the-effect-of-beauty
-standards-in-professional-america [https://perma.cc/6XTB-BCNF].
28. ld.
29. Sheppard Mullin, Dress and Grooming Policies in the Workplace, SHEPPARD
MULLIN LAB. & E:MP. L. BLOG (May 15, 2009), https:/lwww.laboremploymentlawblog.com
/2009/05/articleslhiring-discipline-terminationldress-and-grooming-policies-in-the-work
place [https://perma.cc/4YX9-3U2Q].
30. Emily Jane Perkins, Regulating Appearance in the Workplace: An Employer's
Guide To Avoid Employment Discrimination Lawsuits, NAT'L L. REV. (Mar. 18, 2014),
https:l/www.natlawreview.com/article/regulating-appearance-workplace-employer-s
-guide-to-avoid-employment-discrimination [https://perma.cc/8DB6-NFWT].
31. EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d 1018, 1035 (11th Cir. 2016).
32. Lisa E. Kaplan & Samantha K. Smith, Grooming Policies in the Workplace: 11th
Circuit Upholds Employer's Dreadlock Ban, USA (Oct. 13, 2016), https://www.lexology
.comllibrary/detail.aspx?F55d48d8a-dce6-4981-81c0-00470b99a20a [https:l/perma.cdPX
W5-XNSF].
33. See Perkins, supra note 30.
34. Kaplan & Smith, supra note 32.
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This Note will consider the courts' current conceptualization of
race, and explain why the immutability requirement, as it applies
to protected classes under Title VII, should be abandoned or applied
less stringently. This Note will discuss the purpose, provisions, and
exclusions of Title VII and address some of its inadequacies. The
Note will further analyze the existing case law related to workplace
grooming policies that ban certain hairstyles, and discuss possible
precedent for broadening the category of race to include ethnic hairstyles. And lastly, this Note concludes with some plausible recommendations for amending the law.
I. THERE'S NOTHING DREADFUL ABOUT MY LOCKS
In 2014, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
filed a lawsuit against Catastrophe Management Solutions (CMS)
on behalf of Plaintiff Chastity Jones, a Black woman, whose job offer
was rescinded after she declined to cut off her dreadlocks. 35 The
EEOC argued that by rescinding Jones's offer pursuant to its grooming policy, CMS violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
the practice ofbanning dreadlocks, 36 a hairstyle "physiologically and
culturally associated with people of African descent," in the workplace, constitutes racial discrimination. 37 CMS's policy read: "[a]ll
personnel are expected to be dressed and groomed in a manner that
projects a professional and businesslike image while adhering to
company and industry standards and/or guidelines .... [H]airstyle
should reflect a business/professional image. No excessive hairstyles
or unusual [hairstyles] are acceptable[.]" 38
The district court dismissed the Plaintiffs complaint pursuant
to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), for failing to plausibly
state a claim of intentional discrimination based on race. 39 Subsequently, in its amended complaint that went before the Eleventh
Circuit, the EEOC made four new arguments to defend its position
that having dreadlocks was a racial characteristic for purposes of
Title VII. 40 First, it rejected the court's biological definition of race
and asserted that race was a social construct. 41 Second, it argued
that the concept of race was not "limited to or defined by immutable
35. EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d 1018, 1020-21 (11th Cir. 2016).
36. Dreadlocks ('locks'') consist of sections of hair that are permanently locked
together and cannot be unlocked without cutting.
37. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1), 2000e-2(m) (1964); see also Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols.,
852 F.3d at 1023.
38. CatastropheMgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d at 1022.
39. Id. at 1020.
40. Id. at 1022.
41. Id.
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physical characteristics." 42 Third, the EEOC referred to its own manual and explained that race encompassed "cultural characteristics
related to race or ethnicity, including 'grooming practices.' "43 Lastly,
the EEOC likened dreadlocks to skin color, a characteristic of race. 44
After addressing the race point, the EEOC indicated that it
intended to proceed under a disparate treatment theory, alleging
that CMS intentionally discriminated against Jones on the basis of
race. 45 However, in the view ofthe court, this is where the EEOC
misstepped. 46 While claiming to bring their suit under a disparate
treatment theory, the EEOC made disparate impact arguments
instead. 47 They argued that "the people most adversely ... affected
by a dreadlocks ban, such as CMS'[s] [policy], are African-Americans,"
and because this was a disparate treatment case, the Eleventh Circuit
declined to address the EEOC's arguments that CMS's policy had a
disproportionate effect on Black employees. 48 IDtimately, because the
EEOC conflated two very similar, but legally distinct theories of
liability, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling.49
II. STRANDS OF TITLE VII
Nearly fifty years ago, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the
comprehensive Civil Rights Act of 1964 in response to the longstanding history of segregation and discrimination in the United
States-which denied certain groups access and opportunities for
decades.5°From this legislation, Title VII was created specifically to
ensure equal opportunity in America's workplaces and to provide a
federal remedy for those discriminated against on the basis of race,
sex, religion, or national origin.61 The law also created the EEOC. 6 2
The law generally prohibits employers from using a person's race,
sex, religion, or national origin to make hiring decisions, grant or
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. CatastropheMgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d at 1022.
45. Id. at 1024.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. (citation omitted).
49. See Gandy, supra note 19.
50. Jacqueline A. Berrien, Statement on 50th Anniversary of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, EEOC (July 2, 2014), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoclhistory/cra50thlindex.cfm [https:/1
perma.cci56PZ-6EHK].
51. See id.; Know Your Rights: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, AAUW, https://
www.aauw.org/what-we-dollegal-resourcesfkn.ow-your-rights-at-workltitle-vii [https://perma
.cc/X8RZ-XVU8].
52. Dawn Rosenberg McKay, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, BALANCE CAREERS (Apr. 7, 20 17), https:/lwww. thebalance.com/title-vii-of-the-civil-rights-act-of-1964
-525697 [https://perma.cci7H9V-LCCW].
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deny promotions, or determine a person's pay or benefits.53 Further,
Title VII protection extends to both employees and job applicants. 64
Despite the passing of this law, discrimination based on race
and gender in the workplace remains a serious problem. 55 In 2016,
the EEOC received a total of91,503 complaints, and more than half
of the claims were related to both race and sex discrimination. 56

A. The Immutability Requirement
With the passing of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination
Act (GINA) 57 and the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendment
Act (ADAAA), 58 Congress has added genetic information and disability to the list of characteristics employers cannot consider under
Title VII. 59 In light of these recent developments in the law, it begs
the question of why other characteristics are excluded from Title
VII's statutory scheme, namely, cultural aspects related to race and
other traits fundamental to one's identity. 60
While the concept of immutability provides a unifying principle
for all traits covered by Title VII, it fails to address more elusive
forms of discrimination that the law does not account for. 61 For
example, under current law, it is perfectly legal for an employer to
consider an applicant's appearance when making hiring decisions. 62
Employers recognize that attractiveness sells and that appearance
affects perceived characteristics such as intelligence, motivation,
wealth, and overall capability. 63 Furthermore, psychological studies
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Seeid.
56. U.S. EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMP. COMM'N, Charge Statistics (Charges filed with
EEOC) FY 1997 Through FY 2017, https://www.eeoc.govl/eeoclstatistics/enforcement
/charges.cfm [https://perma.cc/YTW4-6QAU].
57. Under Title II of GINA, it is illegal to discriminate against employees or applicants
because of genetic information. See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000ff (2008). Under this law, employers may not use genetic information in making employment decisions or request genetic information or test results as a condition of
employment. Id.
58. The ADAAA emphasizes that the definition of disability should be construed in
favor of broad coverage of individuals to the maximum extent allowed by the ADA and
generally should not require extensive analysis. ADA Amendments Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101 (2008).
59. Sharona Hoffman, The Importance of Immutability in Employment Discrimination
Law, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1483, 1483 (2011).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Ritu Mahajan, The Naked Truth: Appearance Discrimination, Employment, and
the Law, 14 AsiAN AM. L.J. 165, 165 (2007).
63. Perkins, supra note 30.
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have proven this very phenomenon of associating physical attractiveness with success. 64
A famous and historic illustration of this phenomenon was the
nation's first televised presidential debate between Richard Nixon
and John F. Kennedy in 1960.65 Viewers who watched the debate on
television saw Nixon who appeared pale, sickly, and underweight
from a recent hospitalization in comparison to Kennedy, who looked
calm, confident, and reportedly had been tanning the day before. 66
Those who only listened to the debate on the radio thought Nixon was
the winner. 67 However, by 1960, eighty-eight percent of Americans
had televisions and believed that Kennedy won the debate. 68
Some argue that employers have a legitimate business interest
in employee appearance, and it should be no surprise that employers are more likely to hire physically attractive individuals and
exclude applicants who do not appear to fit in. 69 Hence, in theory, an
employer could choose not to hire someone because she is overweight, does not wear makeup, or is simply "less attractive."70
As discussed earlier, our society privileges whiteness as the
standard of beauty, and those who do not meet that standard are
perceived unfavorably. 71 Furthermore, these biases related to appearance can impact social interactions, including one's ability to
gain employment.72 Thus, a woman like Chastity Jones-who has
dreadlocks-may be perceived as lazy, incompetent, or less productive simply because she does not meet societal expectations of what
is acceptable appearance or beauty. 73 What makes appearance-based
racial discrimination difficult to detect is that it is not "explicitly
coded." 74 Instead, policies that target ethnic hairstyles are rooted in
people's attitudes, and frankly, misconceptions about black hair. 75
64. Ray Williams, "I'm Successful Because I'm Beautiful"-How We Discriminate,
LINKEDIN (June 27, 2014), https:/lwww.linkedin.com/pulse/20140627135441-1011572--i
-m-successful-because-i-m-beautiful-how-we-discriminate [https://perma.cc/W24B-KTTQ].
65. See Kayla Webley, How the Nixon-&nnedy Debate Changed the World, TIME
(Sept. 23, 2010), http://oontent.time.oomltime/nation/article/0,8599,2021078,00.html [https://
perma.cdK6U9-X9JS].
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See Williams, supra note 64.
70. Seeid.
71. See Ramsey, supra note 3.
72. See Mahajan, supra note 62, at 165.
73. See EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgm.t. Sols., 852 F.3d 1018, 1018 (11th Cir. 2016);
Mahajan, supra note 62, at 165.
74. Axelrod, supra note 27.
75. See HloniphaMokoena, From Slavery to Colonialism and School Rules: A History
ofMyths About Black Hair, CONVERSATION (Aug. 31, 2016, 10:55 AM), http://theconversa
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Natural hairstyles like Afros have historically been tied to radical political movements and leaders like Angela Davis and the Black
Panthers. 76 But wearing one's hair naturally has little to do with
politics. It is simply wearing one's hair how it naturally grows on
one's head. Specific to dreadlocks, the most enduring stereotype
about black natural hair is that it is dirty. 77 Urban legend has it
that Bob Marley had forty-seven different strands of lice in his
dreadlocks when he died. 78 These types of speculations are problematic because they perpetuate harmful stereotypes about black hair
that are often inaccurate. 79
Another stereotype is that Afros and dreadlocks are the results of
unwashed, or "unkept" hair.80 On the contrary, dreadlocks, like Afros,
are the result of natural hair growth and require extensive maintenance. 81 Like any haircare routine, washing one's hair on a regular
basis is essential to keeping the hair neat and clean.82 Water also
helps "lock" the hair as it naturally kinks the hair, resulting in a
stronger hold. 83 Lockticians84 also recommend using natural oils and
hair butters to retain moisture and condition the hair to prevent
dryness.85 Furthermore, as the hair continues to grow, there are several methods one can use to incorporate new growth into existing
hair strands, including palm rolling, dread balling, and crocheting.86
It is unlikely that when Congress first passed the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 it considered bans on ethnic hairstyles a form of racial
discrimination. 87 But as proven with the creation of GINA and the
ADAAA, Title VII can be expanded to reach injustices not contemplated in 1964.88
tion.com/from-slavery-to-colonialism-and-school-rules-a-history-of-myths-about-black
-hair-64676 [https://perma.cciG54H-RK44].
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Ariane, 4 Tips for Dreadlock Care, BLACK NAPS (Jan. 10, 2013), https://blacknaps
.org/2013/01110/4-tips-for-dreadlock-care [https://perma.cci5F7K-V57J].
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. A locktician is a hairstylist who specializes in dreadlocks. See Jeffrey Bradley,
Locticians Help You Grow Great Dreadlocks, STREETDIRECTORY, https:/lwww.streetdirec
tory.com/travel_guide/42992/beauty_tips/locticians_help_you_grow_great_dreadlocks.
html [https://perma.cci228N-RQQJ].
85. DreadlockMaintencmce, BLACK WOMEN BEAUTY CENT., https:/!www.black-women
-beauty-central.com/dreadlock-maintenance.html [https://perma.cciKB3D-LYRY] .
86. How to maintain the perfect Dreadlocks, DREAD SHOP, http://www.dreadlocks.com
. a u/en/content/10-dreadlocks-maintenance-guide-step-by-step-instructions-and-faqs
[https://perma.cci8GGN-PTWG].
87. Gandy, supra note 19.
88. Id.
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The courts' current conceptualization of race under Title VII
leave Black women, who stand at the intersection of race and
gender, the most vulnerable to discriminatory practices like banning
quintessentially black hairstyles.89 Professor Kimberle Crenshaw,
prominent civil rights advocate and critical race theorist, introduced
the term "intersectionality'' as a way of framing social justice issues,
particularly those that affect Black women. 90 The term in its name
recognizes the overlapping and intersecting systems of injustice
certain communities face, instead of categorizing things independently as a race, gender, or class issue as that approach fails to
capture the experience of individuals who are subject to injustice
vis-a-vis all these identities at once.91 Quite oppositely, the courts do
not recognize intersectional claims of discrimination. 92
In DeGraffenreid v. General Motors, five Black female plaintiffs
sued General Motors for employment discrimination, alleging that
the company's "last hired-first fired" seniority system perpetuated
the effects of past discrimination against Black women.93 Evidence
presented at trial "revealed that General Motors simply did not hire
Black women prior to 1964 and that all the Black women hired after
1970 lost their jobs in a seniority-based layoff [following] a subsequent recession." 94 In that case, the district court held that "black
women" were not a special class under Title VII and that they could
only sue on the separate bases of race or sex discrimination, not
both. 96 The court reasoned that the plaintiffs "should not be allowed
to combine statutory remedies to create a new 'super-remedy' which
would give them relief beyond what the drafters of the relevant
statutes intended."96 Additionally, the court concluded that ''because
General Motors did hire women-albeit white women-during the
period that no Black women were hired," the seniority system could
not have possibly perpetuated any sort of sex discrimination. 97

89. Kimberle Crenshaw on Intersectionality, More than Two Decades Later, COLUM.
L. SCH. (June 8, 2017), https://www.law.columbia.edu/news/2017/06/kimberle-crenshaw
-intersectionality [https://perma.cd6TG8-RP7A].
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black

Feminist Critique ofAntidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, andAntiracist Politics,
1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 141 (1989).
93. DeGraffenreid v. Gen. Motors, 413 F. Supp. 142, 143 (E.D. Mo. 1976).
94. Crenshaw, supra note 92, at 141.
95. Id. at 142.
96. Id. at 141.
97. Id. at 142.
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Following the DeGraffenreid court's logic, Black women are
protected only to the extent their experiences fit neatly into either
of the two classes protected by the law. 98 In practice, this view favors
the most privileged covered by Title VII's statutory scheme, specifically White women and Black men, while marginalizing Black
women, who are burdened by and subjected to more nuanced forms
of discrimination. 99 This reality demands the need to change the
way courts understand race generally, in order to afford greater
protections for certain subclasses within minority groups.
In EEOC v. Catastrophe Management Solutions, the Eleventh
Circuit held that Title VII protection only extends to immutable
traits of race and that mutable characteristics such as hairstyles,
even if culturally associated with a protected class, are not protected
characteristics. 100 However, Chastity Jones is not the first plaintiff
to sue her employer for banning her hairstyle. 101 In 1981, Renee
Rogers, a flight attendant, sued American Airlines for its grooming
policy that prohibited employees from wearing cornrows. 102 She
argued that the policy violated her right under Title VII among other
things, and discriminated against her as a Black woman. 103
The district court disagreed and held that a neutral employer
policy against women wearing cornrows 104 was not a race-based
distinction, and that such a policy would only violate Title VII if it
had a disparate impact on Black women and was not consistent with
a job-related or business necessity. 105 The court went on further to
say that if the policy banned Mro hairstyles, then it would be a racebased distinction and closer to a violation of Title VII, as Afros are
a result of natural hair growth, not artifice. 106 In the court's opinion,
an all-braided hairstyle is an "easily changed characteristic'' and cannot be the basis of a discrimination claim. 107 To add insult to injury,
the court attributed a hairstyle that has been culturally and historically worn by Black people to a White woman, by suggesting that
the plaintiff only chose to wear her hair in braids after the actress
98. Id.
99. Seeid.
100. Kaplan & Smith, supra note 32.
101. Axelrod, supra note 27.
102. Id.
103. Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 231-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
104. Cornrows are a type ofbraided hairstyle, where the hair is braided onto the scalp
in rows, usually braided all the way down to the nape of the neck. See Cornrow, MERRIAM WEBSTER, https:/lwww.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/comrow [https://perma.cc

IRKL3-AYRC].
105. Gandy, supra note 19.
106. Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 232.
107. Id.
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Bo Derek "popularized," but really culturally appropriated, the hairstyle in the film 10. 108
The court's determination that American Airlines's policy did not
exclusively target Black women, but applied evenly to anyone who
might want to wear his or her hair this way, fails to consider the
cultural significance or practical reasons why Black women choose
certain hairstyles, illuminating the federal judiciary's overwhelming
whiteness and lack of cultural competency. 109 While to some hair
may seem trivial, the issue ofblack hair is anything but trivial. 110
During the late 18th Century, "tignon laws" required Black and
Creole women in Louisiana to wear head scarves because they wore
their hair "in such elaborate ways that it attracted the attention of
[W]hite men."m These laws were not only to keep Black women out
ofthe White male gaze, but to mitigate White women's jealousy, as
it was common for White men to openly keep Black women as their
mistresses. 112 Thus, very early in American history, Black women's
natural hair was an issue of law and a matter of contention. 113
Market research revealed that in 2012, the black haircare market
was valued at $684 million with a projection of $761 million by
2017. 114 When taking into account general market brands, weaves,
extensions, wigs, independent beauty supply stores, distributors, ecommerce, styling tools, and appliances, the industry is worth approximately $500 billion-in other words, half a trillion dollars. 115
It should come as no surprise that Black women spend a significant
amount of money on haircare given the persistent intolerance and
bias surrounding natural hair in the workplace. 116
Workplace grooming policies generally require that an employee's
hair is groomed in a manner that is professional, businesslike, not "too
excessive," or unconventional. 117 Moreover, since these policies track
108. See id.; see also Allison P. Davis & Marcus Jones, Bo Derek Really Doesn't Want
to Talk About Cornrows, CUT (July 16, 2015), https://www.thecut.com/2015/07/bo-derek
-doesnt-want-to-talk-about-cornrows.html [https://perma.cc/MD87-BH6H].
109. See Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 231.
110. Axelrod, supra note 27.
111. Brittany Willis, Never Forget #021: Black Women's Hair Was Once illegal, VISIBILITY PROJECT (Feb. 3, 2016), http://www.thevisibilityproject.com/2016/02/03/never-for
get-021-there-were-laws-that-banned-black-hair [https://perma.cc/URF7-4LTW].
112. Id.
113. Seeid.
114. Antonia Opiah, The Changing Business ofBlack Hair, a Potentially $500b Industry, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 25, 2014), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/antonia-opiah
/the-changing-business-of-_b_4650819 .html [https://perma.cc/ZH8S-ZLZ4].
115. Id.
116. Cf. id.
117. Dawn D. Bennett-Alexander & Linda F. Harrison, My Hair Is Not Like Yours:
Workplace Hair Grooming Policies for African American Women As Racial Stereotyping
in Violation of Title VII, 22 CARDOZO J. L. & GENDER 437, 438 (2016).
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normative standards of appearance, specifically Eurocentric standards
of beauty, they appear to be racially neutral when in fact they are
race specific. 118 When enforced, these policies exclude Black women's
natural hairstyles--put differently, Black women who decide to wear
their hair in its unaltered texture are excluded from the workplace. 119
Thus, in order to be in compliance with these policies, Black women
must alter the natural qualities of their hair or wear false hair. 120
Famous Judge Mablean Ephriam, from Fox Network's Divorce
Court, was fired after seven years, in part because she refused to wear
a wig per the network's demand. 121 Unlike the plaintiff in Rogers,
"Judge Mablean was willing to perm or straighten her hair." 122 However, in season six, she had no choice but to wear a wig after suffering severe hair loss as a result of the chemical relaxing process. 123
Additionally, the cost of chemical relaxers ranges from $60 to $300, or
$40 to $400 for touch-ups between relaxers, which is usually required
every six weeks. 124 Again, the judiciary ignores Black women's unique
struggles associated with the long, arduous, and relatively expensive
process of styling one's hair to adhere to workplace grooming policies,
that their White counterparts do not experience.
Despite the courts having categorized both braids and dreadlocks as mutable characteristics, both hairstyles take to the natural
texture of the person's hair, which is a biological element ofrace. 125
The Eleventh Circuit even conceded that black hair texture is an
immutable characteristic, similar to skin color, but strangely reached
the opposite conclusion regarding black hairstyles, noting that they
are not because they can be changed. 126 Prior to Rogers, the Fifth
Circuit ruled that businesses could refuse to hire men with long hair
because hair length is a mutable characteristic not protected under
Title VII. 127 Subsequent courts that followed this reasoning upheld
employers' policies against braids, facial hair, and dreadlocks, essentially making hair a permissible basis for employment decisions. 128
118. Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning a Title VII Remedy for Transparently White Subjective Decisionmaking, 104 YALE L.J. 2009, 2013 (1995).
119. Bennett-Alexander & Harrison, supra note 117, at 438-39.
120. Id.
121. Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Another Hair Piece: Exploring New Strands ofAnalysis
Under Title VII, 98 GEO. L.J. 1079, 1125 (2010).
122. Id.; see also Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 233 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
123. Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 121, at 1125.
124. Id. at 1114.
125. Gandy, supra note 19.
126. EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d 1018, 1030 (11th Cir. 2016).
127. Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ'g Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th Cir. 1975).
128. AB. Wilkinson, No Dreadlocks Allowed, ATLANTIC (Nov. 3, 2016), https:/lwww.the
atlantic.comfbusiness/archive/2016/11/no-dreadlocks-allowed/506270 [https://perma.cc/8K
HU-BG62] .
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In a different case, not related to hair but culture, the Fifth Circuit upheld an employer's "speak-only-English" policy after a plaintiff
of Mexican descent sued his company for firing him for speaking in
Spanish to a co-worker. 129 He argued that the company's policy discriminated on the basis of national origin, which was a protected
characteristic under Title VII, but the court disagreed. 130 The court
reasoned that even though he was of Mexican descent, he chose to
speak in Spanish and that choice qualified as a mutable cultural
characteristic. 131 Furthermore, the court, in explaining its decision,
emphasized that "[n]ational origin'' was not to be confused with
"ethnic or socio[-]cultural traits." 132 Thus, CMS was able to win its
case against Chastity Jones by relying on well-established legal precedent that Title VII does not protect the culture of the individuals
it was created to protect. 133
Operating under this same schema, discriminating against a
person who speaks English with an accent, which is often associated
with one's national origin, is not expressly prohibited under Title
VII either. 134 In fact, some employers have successfully used claims
of "unintelligible English" to deny jobs to non-native speakers. 135
However, in recent years, the amount oflitigation surrounding accent
discrimination has skyrocketed and the EEOC has been able to
reach some favorable settlements on behalf of their employees. 136
For example, in 2012, Delano Regional Medical Center in California's San Joaquin Valley settled for $975,000 in a national origin case
involving a class of roughly seventy Filipino American hospital workers.137 The plaintiffs alleged that the medical center's staff frequently
harassed them, mocked their accents, and ordered them to speak in
English at times when they already were. 138 Supervisors, staff, and
even volunteers at the hospital were encouraged to berate the workers,
and the plaintiffs endured these types of comments for nearly six
129. Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264,266 (5th Cir. 1980).
130. Id.
131. Wilkinson, supra note 128.
132. Garcia, 618 F.2d at 269.
133. Kaplan & Smith, supra note 32.
134. See Beatrice Bich-Dao Nguyen, Accent Discrimination and the Test of Spoken
English: A Call for an Objective Assessment ofthe Comprehensibility ofNonnative Speakers,
1AsiANL.J.117, 122 (1994).
135. Id. at 117.
136. Melinda Koster, Accent Discrimination: An Overview, SANFORD HEISLER SHARP,
LLP (Dec. 13, 2017), https://sanfordheisler.com/accent-discrimination [https://perma.cc
/744C-9ZUV].
137. Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n, Delano Regional Medical
Center to Pay Nearly $1 Million in EEOC National Origin Discrimination Suit (Sept. 17,
20 12), https:l/www l.eeoc.gov/leeoclnewsroom/release/9-17-12a.cfm?renderforprint= 1
[https://perma.cciH59L-WKWB] .
138. Id.
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years. 139 According to the EEOC, some workers received threats of
arrest if they did not speak English and were told to go back to the
Philippines. 140 In one particularly egregious incident, "an employee
sprayed air freshener on a claimant's lunch due to the offender's
self-professed hatred of Filipino food." 141
In some cases, an employer can legally dismiss an employee if
a fluency in English is required to perform the job and the employee
cannot be understood within the context of the work environment
and work assignments. 142 However, the courts take a "very searching look" at an employer's reasons for using accent as a basis for
terminating someone's employment. 143 The most common example
of an employer legally being able to fire an employee for their accent
is in a customer service or telemarketing job, where it is helpful that
customers understand the employee. 144
The bottom line is that it is not always illegal for an employer "to
render a decision based on an individual's accent." 145 In court, all the
employer would need to prove is that effective spoken communication
in English is necessary for the employee to perform his or her job
duties and the person's accent materially interferes with his or her
ability to communicate orally in English. 146 In such cases, courts must
make a determination about the individual's comprehensibility, which
is a process that is riddled with subjectivity and bias. 147

B. "Accident of Birth"
The Supreme Court has suggested that the identification of an
immutable characteristic can support suspect class status and warrant
heightened scrutiny .148 When the Supreme Court has found that the
trait at issue is not immutable, it has declined to apply heightened
scrutiny. 149
InFrontiero v. Richardson, the Court defined an immutable characteristic as "an accident of birth." 150 In Plyler v. Doe, it declined to
grant suspect class status to undocumented students because the law
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Understanding Workplace Discrimination, LEGALMATCH, https:/lwww.legal.match
.comfl.aw-library/article/accent-discrimination-lawyers.html [https:/!permacdUQT7-H32Y]
[hereinafter Workplace Discrimination].
143. Koster, supra note 136.
144. Workplace Discrimination, supra note 142.
145. Koster, supra note 136.
146. Workplace Discrimination, supra note 142.
147. See Nguyen, supra note 134, at 117.
148. Hoffman, supra note 59, at 1510.
149. Id.
150. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
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views entry into that class as voluntary, and immutable characteristics are not products of"conscious ... action." 161 In previous cases, the
Court has determined that a group is a suspect class when it bears
"traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is not saddled with such
disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to
command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process." 152 Nevertheless, in Plyler, the Court recognized the special
disabilities Congress imposed on undocumented persons for violating
federal law, but found that the state's differential treatment of aliens
is consistent with its interest in enforcing its immigration policy. 153
Finding that undocumented immigrants were not a suspect class, the
Court applied rational basis analysis to ultimately strike down the
statute denying undocumented students access to free public school
education, as the Court saw no real difference between a lawful
resident and an undocumented person receiving public education. 154
Today, in the employment context, Section 1324(1)(b) of the Immigration Reform and Control Act makes it illegal for employers to
discriminate based on citizenship or immigration status. 155 In the
United States, a person's citizenship is immutable until they become
eligible for naturalization, suggesting that citizenship is not absolutely unchangeable. 156 On the other hand, for some, citizenship can
be considered "an accident by birth," specifically those who automatically become citizens by virtue ofbeing born in the United States. 157
Either way, one's citizenship status does not comfortably fit within
the concept of immutability that seems to govern federal antidiscrimination statutes. 168
Some might consider one's political affiliation "as personally defining as [one's] religion." 159 However, in Vieth v. Jubelirer, the Court
decided that political affiliation is not an immutable characteristic,
as it "may shift from one election to the next." 160 Nevertheless, the
immutability requirement does little to explain why some traits are
protected by Title VII, wbile others are not. 161

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982).
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 224.
See id. at 230; see also Hoffman, supra note 59, at 1510.
See Immigration Refonn and Control Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(l)(B) (2006).
Hoffman, supra note 59, at 1508.
Id. at 1516.
Seeid.
Id. at 1536.
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 287 (2004).
Hoffman, supra note 59, at 1521.
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Many characteristics can be described as "accidents ofbirth," but
"they do not enjoy protected status." 162 For example, there are no
employment discrimination statutes that address height, eye color,
or handedness. 163 Therefore, it is clear that not all immutable characteristics are or should be the subject of Title VII. 164 In fact, there
are many immutable traits that are excluded from statutory protection presumably ''because employers are unlikely to care about them
or ... make adverse decisions based on them." 165 Thus, it may be unreasonable for the legislature to intervene and add these traits to the
law when the "probability of bias based on these [characteristics] is
very low." 166
It is also important to highlight that Vieth is the only case after
1986 in which the Supreme Court discusses immutability, suggesting
that its application is no longer necessary and potentially irrelevant
to the equal protection analysis altogether. 167 Thus, the immutability requirement may need to be abandoned in light of our society's
ever-evolving understanding of race, sex, and other identities protected under Title VII.

C. "Fundamental to the Identity"
In addition to adopting the Supreme Court's "accident by birth"
interpretation of immutability, the lower courts also find a trait to be
immutable when it is "so fundamental to the identities or consciences
of its members that members either cannot or should not be required
to change it."168 Under this test, the trait does not have to be entirely
fixed in order for it to be considered immutable-overcoming the
hurdle presented by the "accident of birth'' standard. 169
Traits "so fundamental to the identity" are thought to be a part
of one's self-concept, which is comprised of a mixture of "cultural,
familial, historical, and internal factors." 17° For example, although
religion is one of the protected classes under Title VII, it is technically mutable, given that an individual has the ability to convert to
a different faith. 171 However, some would argue that one's religious
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1522--23.
164. Id. at 1523.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1523.
167. See Samuel A. Marcosson, Constructive Immutability, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 646,
647-48 (2001).
168. Hoffman, supra note 59, at 1512 (citation omitted).
169. Id.
170. Marcosson, supra note 167, at 682--83.
171. Hoffman, supra note 59, at 1508.
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beliefs are nevertheless fundamental to one's world-view and identity.I72
This standard would also apply to individuals who acquire unalterable disabilities through accidents or other misfortunes after
birth. 173 For example, some members ofthe deaf community decline
to wear cochlear implants because they view their disability as a
fundamental component of their identity. 174 Although a separate
law, the ADAAA would apply to this type of situation; the spirit of the
statute honors the personal choice of an individual, who chooses to
remain deaf, and finds penalizing that choice to be unacceptable. 175

D. Race as a Social Construct
Under the Supreme Court's "accident of birth" interpretation,
Chastity Jones's claim might have survived based on the Eleventh
Circuit's concession that black hair texture is an immutable trait as
it is a biological element ofrace. 176 However, race can be illusory when
understood as an entirely biological construct. 177 One scholar defines
race as a "group ofpeople loosely bound together by historically contingent, socially significant elements of their morphology and/or ancestry."178 Based on this view, race is determined by heredity and subject
to chance. 179 But as the EEOC argued in EEOC v. Catastrophe Management Solutions, one's race is not defined or limited by biological
characteristics. 180 In fact, the scientific community would generally
agree that "race is a social construct without biological meaning." 181
Some geneticists believe that while race can serve as a useful tool
to study human genetic diversity, it is an imprecise proxy for the
relationship between ancestry and genetics-making it a poorly
defined marker to measure that diversity .182 For example, in one
study where genomes from Mrica and Europe were compared, there
was "no single variant'' between the two continents. 183
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1518.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1519.
176. EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d 1018, 1030 (11th Cir. 2016); Frontiero
v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
177. See Ian F. Haney L6pez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on
Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 61 (1994).
178. Id. at 40.
179. Id.
180. CatastropheMgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d at 1022.
181. Megan Gannon, Race is a Social Construct, Scientists Argue, SCI. AM. (Feb. 5, 2016),
https:/lwww.scientificamerican.com/article/race-is-a-social-construct-scientists-argue
[https://perma.cc/6G39-TURQ].
182. Id.
183. Id.
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The EEOC also alleged race" 'encompasses cultural characteristics related to race or ethnicity,' including 'grooming practices'" when
citing its Compliance Manual, but astoundingly the federal courts
are not bound by the EEOC's manual, nor by its interpretations of
its own regulations, which the EEOC is responsible for enforcing. 184
Certainly, there are some challenges posed by asking the courts
to include culture within the meaning of race. 185 First, the courts
would have to choose among competing definitions of race. 186 Second,
the courts must decide which cultural practices are associated with
a particular race. 187 And third, the courts would have to justify why
some cultural characteristics and practices are included as a part of
race and explain why others are excluded from Title VII protection. 188
With respect to racial classifications, the Supreme Court has
said, "[c]lear-cut categories do not exist. The particular traits which
have generally been chosen to characterize races have been criticized as having little biological significance."189
In Perkins v. Lake County Department of Utilities, the court was
faced with the challenge of defining race in an employment discrimination suit, alleging disparate treatment in the workplace, due to the
plaintiffs status as an American Indian. 190 And although the plaintiffs claim alleged discrimination on the basis of national origin, the
court largely focused on racial discrimination, and discussed how
perception plays a major role in determining who is a member of a
minority group for purposes of Title VII. 191
In this case, the employer filed two motions for summary judgment, that he was not an American Indian, therefore he was not a
member of a protected class covered by the statute and could not make
out a prima facie case of discrimination. 192 Thus, the question before
the court was whether the plaintiff was in fact American Indian. 193
The court admitted that there was no straightforward answer
when it comes to determining one's racial classification; it is "deceptively complex."194 The court described the amorphous nature of the
184. CatastropheMgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d at 1022.
185. Jon Hyman, Dreadlocks and Race Decision By 11th Circuit Asks Big Questions
on Meaning of Bias, WORKFORCE (Sept. 19, 2016), http://www.workforce.com/2016/09/19
/dreadlocks-race-decision-11th-circuit-asks-big-questions-meaning-bias [https://perma.cc
/N67E-VHYP] .
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Saint Francis Coil. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610 n.4 (1987).
190. Perkins v. Lake Cty. Dep't. ofUtils., 860 F. Supp. 1262, 1264 (N.D. Ohio 1994).
191. Id. at 1273.
192. Id. at 1264.
193. Id. at 1265.
194. Id. at 1271.
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term "race" and explained how "[t]he traditional racial categorizations of Negroid, Caucasoid, and Mongoloid have been narrowed,
expanded, and/or reconfigured by various social scientists and other
disciplines over the years to the point that the very notion of 'race'
may be deemed illusory." 195 The court then considered the history of
racial classification in America, namely the "one-drop rule," when
race was decided by a person's blood and anyone with a single drop
of "black blood," or ancestor of Mrican descent, was considered
Black. 196 Quite oppositely, the "Pocahontas exception" made allowances for Whites who claimed Native American ancestry, allowing
up to one-sixteenth of Native American blood. 197 However, "[a]s early
as 1934 the United States Supreme Court recognized that there was
no strict formula for determining racial class." 198 In fact, the Supreme
Court's approach to determining racial classes proves to be drastically inconsistent with how the lower courts have treated race in
earlier employment discrimination cases. 199
The particular difficulty of categorizing individuals into racial
categories for purposes of Title VII is that the statute distinguishes
between national origin and race, when in cases of racial discrimination, that distinction is often unclear and based on the employer's
perception of that individual. 200 To explain this, the court cited the
Code of Federal Regulations's definition of national origin discrimination, which provides in part: "[t]he Commission defines national
origin discrimination broadly as including, but not limited to, the
denial of equal employment opportunity because of an individual's,
or his or her ancestor's, place of origin; or because an individual has
the physical, cultural or linguistic characteristics of a national origin group."201
195. Id. (citation omitted).
196. Perkins, 860 F. Supp. at 1271 (quoting Lawrence Wright, One Drop of Blood, NEW
YORKER (July 25, 1994)), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1994/07/25/one-drop-of
-blood [https://perma.cd39W6-J9TL].
197. An Act to Preserve Racial Integrity, http://www2.vcdh.virginia.edu/lewisandclark
/studentslprojects/monacans/Contemporary_Monacanslracial.html [https:l/perma.cci7UB4
-PLGM].
198. Perkins, 860 F. Supp. at 1272.
199. Compare Saint. Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604,610 n.4 (1987) (finding
that racial classifications are for the most part "sociopolitical, rather than biological, in nature") with Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (finding that
"[a]n all-braided hair style is 'an easily changed characteristic,' and, even ifsocioculturally
associated with a particular race or nationality, is not an impermissible basis for distinctions in the application ofemployment practices by an employer [under Title VII]j (citation
omitted), and Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 269 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that Title VII
is directed only at discrimination based on race, sex, color, religion or national origin and
does not apply to ethnic or socio-cultural traits).
200. See Perkins, 860 F. Supp. at 1272.
201. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (2018).
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The court concluded by emphasizing that the purpose of Title
VII is to equalize the position of all employees and suggested that
the standard of proof, for plaintiffs to demonstrate their membership
to a protected class, should be lower. 202
In Ham v. South Carolina, Justice Douglas conveyed in his dissenting opinion the idea that "individuals ... flaunt social conventions about gender, race, and status through both action and physical
appearance."203 In a case about a potential juror's prejudice towards
people who wear beards, Justice Douglas discussed how unconventional hair growth is symbolic to rebellion against traditional society
and "disapproval of the way the current power structure handles
social problems''-presumably in reference to the Hippie Movement
during the 1960s.204 He went on further to say that taken as a
statement of one's commitment to social reform, unconventional hair
growth may be seen as a threat to those who support the status quo. 205
And as Justice Douglas's comments are insightful, they are prescient of future litigation arising from workplace grooming policies
and systemic intolerance of Black women's hair. 206
In recent years, "natural hair has become a politicized trend."207
But as one naturalista208 puts it, "I'm not trying to make a statement by being myself."209 Some girls have even faced punishment at
school because of their hair. 210 At a charter school in Massachusetts,
two Black female students were kicked off their sports teams and
prohibited from attending their school prom because they wore their
hair in braids. 211
202. Perkins, 860 F. Supp. at 1276.
203. Deborah Pergament, It's Not Just Hair: Historical and Cultural Considerations
for an Emerging Technology, 75 CHI.·KENT L. REV. 41, 41 (1999--2000); see Ham v. South
Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 529-30 (1973).
204. Ham, 409 U .S. at 530 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
205. Id.
206. See id. at 529--30.
207. Rasha Ali, Detangling the Natural Hair Movement, USC .ANNENBERG MEDIA CTR.
(Oct. 23, 2015, 2:39 PM), http://www.neontommy.com/news/2015/10/when-black-hair
-speaks [https://perma.cc/BB9Q-5MS2].
208. Refers to a person who wears her hair in its natural state. See Confessions of a
Naturalista: Natural Hair is Overrated, FoR liARRIET (Sept. 22, 20 14), http://www.for
harriet.com/2014/09/confessions-of-natura.li.sta-natural-hair.html [https://perma.cc/Q992
-5YPU].
209. Ali, supra note 207.
210. E.g., Marquaysa Battle, Times Black Girls Were Suspended for Their Hairstyles,
ELITE DAILY (May 16, 2017), https://www.elitedaily.comllife/culture/black-girls-natural
-hair-racism-schools/1953497 [https://perma.cc/4R7E-EEVY].
211. Janice Williams, WaronBlackHair: Wearing Braids Gets Black Girls Banned from
Prom at Malden Charter School in Massachusetts, NEWSWEEK (May 12, 2017, 11:00 AM),
http://www.newsweek.com/wearing-braids-sends-black-girls-detention-malden-charter
-school-608303 [https://perma.cc/CM3E-5XH4].

212

WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST.

[Vol. 25:191

The rationale behind the policy was to "serve a 'diverse student
population' that fosters 'a culture that emphasizes education rather
than style, fashion or materialism.' "212 Furthermore, the school believed its policy against hair extensions was in line with its educational mission because of their alleged high cost. 213 In reality, the
school's dress code accomplished the exact opposite. First, enforcement of this hair policy resulted in the singling out of several Black
students whose studies and activities were presumably interrupted
to have their hair inspected. 214 Second, it seemed that the school was
unaware of how textured hair grows in comparison to straight hair,
as the former grows up and the latter grows down, thus any Black
student's hair (as it grows naturally), per se, exceeded the height limit
imposed by the dress code. 215 Third, the school was clearly misinformed about the relative inexpensiveness ofbraiding hair (hair used
for cornrows and braids).216 Generally, people who wear braids use
Kanekalon jumbo braid hair, which costs $2.99 per pack, and that
is on the pricier end of the spectrum. 217 Thus, the school was not
eradicating any socioeconomic differences, as a package of braiding
hair would cost about the same as a package of Goody hair ties. 218
In the professional setting, the unfairness of these grooming
policies stems from the fact that White women are able to wear their
hair in its natural state, whereas Black women are oftentimes criticized, or in some cases fired, for doing the same. 219
For some Black women, hair is inextricably tied to identity. 220
Especially in a society that adheres to Eurocentric standards of
beauty, hair, like skin color, can be a determinant of a positive black
self-image or a "politically 'healthy' state of black subjectivity." 221
212. Id. (citation omitted).
213. Id.
214. See id.
215. Id.; see also Madison Moore, Black Hair Problems, THOUGHT CATALOG (Oct. 15,
20 12), https://thoughtcatalog.comlmadison-moore/20 12/10/black-hair-problemsl [https:/1
perma.cc/Z3J3-FBGP].
216. Jazmine Denise Rogers, Thinking of Getting Box Braids This Summer? What You
Should Know, MADAME NoiRE (July 26, 20 12), http://madamenoire.com/200083/thinking
-of-getting-box-braids-this-summer-what-you-should-know/[https://perma.cdFDX4-6F62].
217. Id.
218. GoODY 0UCHLESS ELASTIC, https://www.target.com/p/goody-174-ouchless-153-elas
tic-black-4mm-17-ctJ-/A-11895555?ref=tgt_adv_XSOOOOOO&AFID=google_pla._df&CPNG
=PLA_Health+Beauty+Shopping&adgroup=SC_Health+Beauty&LID=70000000 11
70770pgs&network=g&device=c&location=9008452&gclid=CjOKCQjwlK7cBRCnARisAJ
iE3MiHOTXnHN6T32e2CYXSP97-DV6fiud64qVffGIGuzEmKrX4MPluiJiaAgElEALw
_ wcB&gclsrc=aw.ds [https://perma.cc/Q5BS-V9R9].
219. See, e.g., Ali, supra note 207.
220. Pergament, supra note 203, at 44.
221. Kobena Mercer, Black Hair I Style Politics, 3 NEW FORMATIONS J. 33, 33 (1987).
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The internalization of white beauty standards begins as early as
childhood, when young Black girls are constantly bombarded with
messages from the media, their peers, and society about what beauty
is. 222 Furthermore, upon realizing that they will never fit society's
racial definition ofbeauty, self-acceptance can become increasingly
difficult, and result in negative self-perception and a culture of selfhatred. 223 A historical example of this phenomenon is the famous
Clark "doll experiment," first conducted in 1939 by social psychologists Kenneth and Mamie Clark, which was designed to illustrate
internalized attitudes about race, and the effect of segregation on
Black children.224
The participants were shown four dolls and asked to identify
the race of the dolls and which color doll they preferred. 225 Most
children chose the white doll and assigned positive attributes to it,
while rejecting the black doll and labeling it as the ''bad" doll. 226
Finally, when asked to choose the doll that looked most like the child,
some participants became so upset after being forced to identify
with the "bad'' doll that they stormed out of the room.227 From this,
the Clarks concluded that "color in a racist society was a very disturbing and traumatic component of an individual's sense of his own
self-esteem and worth."228
llitimately, the Clarks' research proved to be so powerful that
the U.S. Supreme Court cited the doll experiment as one of the key
factors in its decision of Brown v. Board of Education, because of the
demonstrated psychological and emotional harm caused by segregation. 229 In the Court's unanimous opinion, ChiefJustice Earl Warren
wrote that the legal separation of Black children generated "a feeling
of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect
their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."230
Since Brown, the Clark doll experiment is still being used to assess children's attitudes about race, but instead of the question asking
222. Mrica Jackson, How Do We Teach Young Girls of Color Self-Esteem?, ESTABLISH(July 5, 2016), https://theestablishment.colhow-do-we-teach-young-girls-of-color
-self-esteem-dl33d862cl60 [https://perma.cdGQ23-YKP8].
223. Id.
224. Brown at 60: The Doll Test, NAACP LEGAL DEF. FuND, http://www.naacpldf.org
/brown-at-60-the-doll-test [https://perma.cdJ9HR-8DCZ].
225. Id.
226. Michael Beschloss, How an Experiment with Dolls Helped Lead to School Integration, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014105/07/upshotlhow-an-ex
periment-with-dolls-helped-lead-to-school-integration.html [https://perma.cc/7T35-PTJ 4].
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Brown v. Bd. ofEduc., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.ll (1954).
230. Id. at 494.
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which doll is "good" or "bad," the participant is asked which doll is
"pretty'' versus "ugly''-precisely to test the effects of white beauty
standards on Black children. 231 Sixty years later, the research still
yields the same results: that antiblack racism is internalized at a
young age.232
Similar research has been done on the effects of white beauty
standards on the life trajectories of Black women, specifically, the impact internalization has on self-image, academic success, socialization,
and employment. 233 The family is often the earliest and biggest influence in a child's life, and has a major role in the child's emotional,
social, and cognitive development.234 Among Black Americans, skin
color prejudice, also known as "colorism," is a widespread problem
that is perpetuated by those both inside and outside the community.236
In 2001, researchers found that people's attitudes about their own
skin color corresponded with the skin color most idealized by their
family members.236 They found that lighter skin coincided with higher
levels of cultural pride, whereas people with darker complexions reported lower self-esteem. 237 Cultural standards of beauty and attractiveness also play a significant role in one's academic achievement.238
Studies found that young Black girls whose hair and skin color was
the most unlike their White classmates, were often alienated at school
and in other social settings. 239 This social isolation resulted in lower
levels of academic achievement among darker-skinned Black girls,
which led to higher dropout rates in high school and limited employment opportunities as adults, further demonstrating how white standards of beauty alone can impact the life trajectory of Black women.240
231. The Doll Test for Racial Self-Hate: Did It Ever Make Sense?, THE RoOT (May 17,
2014, 3:00AM), https:/lwww.theroot.comlthe-doll-test-for-racial-self-hate-did-it-ever-make
-se-1790875716 [https://perma.cdHNP2-UDYA].
232. See What Dolls Can Tell Us About Race in America, ABC NEWS (Oct. 11, 2006),
https:l/abcnews.go.com/GMA/story?id=2553348&page=1 [https:/!perma.cciV3T8-3FYV].
233. Bryant, supra note 21, at 80.
234. Julie ChriBtensen, The Family's Role in a Child's Development, MOM.ME (Jan. 7,
2013), https://mom.melkids/5258-familys-role-childs-development [https://perma.cc/JHZ3
-GUCX].
235. Kara Taylor, Skin tone prejudice troubles African-American heritage, KENT WIRED
(Apr. 13, 20 14), http://www.kentwired.com/latest_updateslarticle_bbd3a23e-c382-11e3
-b64f-001a4bc:f687B.html [https://perma.cc/BGKK-9TNA].
236. Patricia Raskin, et al., Perceptions of and Preferences for Skin Color, Black Racial
Identity, and Self-Esteem Among African Americans, 31 J . APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 2256,
2256 (2001).
237. Id.
238. Bryant, supra note 21, at 83.
239. Cynthia L. Robinson-Moore, Beauty Standards Reflect Eurocentric ParadigmsSo What? Skin Color, Identity, and Black Female Beauty, 4 J. RACE & POL'y 66, 68 (2008).
240. Id.
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illtimately, race is a social construct with perceivable consequences.241 And although hair is a biological occurrence, it too has
"social and political meanings."242 For these reasons, the judiciary's
concept of immutability with respect to race is incompatible with
society's existing understanding of race, and therefore, should be
abandoned.
III. FINDING PRECEDENT TO EXTEND TITLE VII
PROTECTION TO ETHNIC HAIRSTYLES

Despite the prevalence of hair grooming policies by employers,
the courts have been unwilling to find a constitutional basis for the
argument that hairstyles should be protected by Title VII. 243 With
respect to constitutional challenges, in Kelley v. Johnson, a police
officer challenged a county regulation that limited the length of male
police officers' hair.244 Based on a rational basis analysis, in that
case, the Supreme Court held that the regulation did not violate any
right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 245 The majority
noted that law enforcement officers were subject to regulations requiring specific dress and behavior while members of the general
public were not. 246 Furthermore, the majority noted that the Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in personal grooming is limited
by the state's police power, thus the county's interest in an easily
recognizable, uniform police force, outweighed the plaintiff's right
to wear his hair as he wished. 247
Similarly, the majority of courts have found that hair-length
requirements that "do not cause disparate treatment [between] male
and female employees" are not impermissible under Title VII.248 For
example, in Earwood v. Continental Southeastern Lines, Inc., the
Fourth Circuit held that sex-differentiated grooming standards, as
applied to male bus drivers, did not constitute sex discrimination
under Title VII. 249 The court reasoned that discrimination must be
based on immutable characteristics or protected characteristics, not
mere personal preference. 250
In claims of racial discrimination, "courts have also been unwilling to find a constitutional basis for the claim that hairstyles are
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

Id. at 70.
Pergament, supra note 203, at 52.
Id.
Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 239 (2d Cir. 1976).
Id. at 249.
See id. at 245.
Id.
Pergament, supra note 203, at 54.
Earwood v. Cont'l Se. Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349, 1350 (4th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 1351.
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immutable and should enjoy constitutional protection" (i.e. be protected by Title VII).251 However, the immutability requirement has not
been "uniformly applied in cases where an immutable characteristic
adversely [a]ffects an individual's ability to comply with a grooming
requirement."252 In Bradley v. Pizzaco, a Black plaintiff successfully
argued that a policy banning beards disparately impacted Black
men due to their susceptibility to pseudofolliculitis (PFB). 253 He
argued that because the condition occurs in fifty percent of Black
men in comparison to only one percent of White men, enforcing the
policy was disparate impact race discrimination. 254 Furthermore,
because the plaintiff was a pizza delivery man, the no-beard policy
was neither directly related nor necessary to the job.255 Conceivably,
a no-beard policy in other professions may be reasonable. For example, firefighters who must wear respirators, and in order for the mask
to operate properly and safely, its edges must be able to seal securely
to the wearer's face. 256 In Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, the city made
this very argument and was able to defend its no-beard policy for
firefighters as a business necessity.257
Nevertheless, like the plaintiff in Bradley, Chastity Jones could
similarly argue that CMS's policy against dreadlocks is disparate
impact race discrimination, as the hairstyle is consistent with the
immutable trait of hair texture, and the policy is not job-related or a
business necessity.258 To prevail on a disparate impact claim, she would
have to demonstrate how the grooming policy has "an actual, ... not
necessarily deliberate, adverse impact on [a] protected group[]," in
this case, Black people. 259
Here, the chances that an individual other than a Black person
would have dreadlocks-albeit the occasional White Rastafarianare presumably low considering the high prevalence of the hairstyle
251. See Pergament, supra note 203, at 55.
252. Id.
253. Pseudofolliculitis barbae (also known as razor bumps) is a bacterial infection
caused by shaving. The condition arises when "highly curved hair grows back into the
skin causing inflammation and a foreign body reaction. Over time, this can cause keloidal
scarring, which looks like hard bumps of the beard and neck areas." The most effective
remedy is to grow a beard. See Pseudofolliculitis Barbae, AM. 0STEOPATIITC COLL. DERMATOLOGY, https://www.aocd.org/page/PseudofolliculitisB [https://perma.cc/6VNY-SYCC];
see also Bradley v. Pizzaco of Neb., Inc., 7 F.3d 795, 796 (8th Cir. 1993).
254. Bradley, 7 F.3d at 796.
255. See id. at 798; see also Pergament, supra note 203, at 55.
256. Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F. 3d 1112, 1114 (11th Cir. 1993).
257. Id. at 1119.
258. EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852 F. 3d 1018, 1020 (11th Cir. 2016) (citation
omitted).
259. See id. at 1024; see also EEO: General: What Are Disparate Impact and Disparate
Treatment, Soc'y HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. (Aug. 30, 2016), https:/lwww.shrm.org/resources
andtoolsltools-and-samples/hr-qa/pages/disparateimpactdisparatetreatment.aspx.
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in the Black community. 260 Furthermore, Jones was initially hired for
a call center position and it is unclear how dreadlocks would impede
on her ability to perform her job, or interfere with CMS's business
interests, given she would be presumably interacting with customers
through telephone communications only. 261 By enforcing this policy,
CMS is effectively forcing Jones to cut off all her hair, as that is the
only way to "undo" dreadlocks, and be bald or wear a wig until her
hair grows back, assuming that her natural hair will not be considered
"excessive" or "unusual."262 Furthermore, assuming that CMS's policy
generally follows societal standards of appearance, requiring Jones
to change her hair would impose undue burdens that are not generally expected of White women, whose hair is considered the norm. 263

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
As discussed earlier, Title VII "can be expanded to reach injustices not contemplated in 1964."264 For example, when Congress passed
Title VII, it did not view gender stereotyping to be sex discrimination.265 It was not until .Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, in 1989, when the
Supreme Court expanded Title VII to include gender stereotyping. 266
Likewise, Congress did not initially consider sexual harassment actionable under Title VII untilMeritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, when
the Court held that a claim of "hostile work environment" sexual
harassment was a form of sex discrimination.267 Yet, surprisingly,
there is currently no federal law prohibiting discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation. 268
The lower courts are split on the issue ofLGBT employees who
experience sexual harassment related to their sexual orientation. 269
Some courts have ruled that these types of comments represent discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, which is not covered
under federal law, whereas other courts have ruled that these types
of comments stem from gender stereotypes, which are recognized as
a form of sex discrimination prohibited by law. 270 Additionally, there
260. See CatastropheMgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d at 1022.
261. See id. at 1021.
262. See id. at 1022.
263. Gandy, supra note 19.
264. Id.; see also supra Section II.A.
265. See Gandy, supra note 19.
266. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989).
267. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 78 (1986).
268. Your Rights Sexual Orientation Discrimination, WORKPLACE FAIRNESS, https://www
.workplacefairness.org/sexual-orientation-discrimination#2 [https://perma.cciM6DD-C36K]
[hereinafter Your Rights].
269. Id.
270. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258; Your Rights, supra note 268.
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are several federal court decisions supporting the protection of transgender individuals in cases involving sex discrimination. 271 Most
recently, the Eleventh Circuit reversed summary judgment for the
employer on plaintiffs claim that she was terminated from her job
as an automechanic because she was transgender. 272 The court
remanded the case for trial because there was sufficient evidence to
create a triable issue of fact as to whether gender bias was a motivating factor for the plaintiffs termination. 273 Likewise, in Smith v.
City of Salem, the plaintiff alleged that he was suspended based on
sex, because he began to express a more feminine appearance and
advised his employer of his intention of undergoing a complete physical transformation from male to female. 274 In that case, the Sixth
Circuit held that Title VII prohibits discrimination against transgender individuals based on gender stereotyping. 275 The court reasoned that the "narrow view" of the term "sex," in prior case law
denying transgender individuals statutory protection, was no longer
valid in light of the Supreme Court's ruling in Price. 276
In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., the late Justice
Antonin Scalia, one of the most celebrated originalists in Supreme
Court history, noted in the majority opinion that, while same-sex
harassment was "assuredly not the principal evil Congress was concerned with when it enacted Title VII":
[S]tatutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil [they
were passed to combat] to cover reasonably comparable evils, and
it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed. Title
VII prohibits 'discriminat[ion] ... because of ... sex' .... [This]
must extend to sexual harassment of any kind that meets the
statutory requirements.277
CONCLUSION

Surely, Justice Scalia's logic would similarly apply to hair discrimination against Black women. 278 And although Congress may
271. See generally Examples of Court Decisions Supporting Coverage of LGBT-Related
Discrimination Under Title VII, EEOC, https:/lwww.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/wyskllgbt
_examples_decisions.c:fm [https:/lperma.cc/S8V9-36QJ].
272. Chavez v. Credit Nation Auto Sales, No. 14-14596, 2016 WL 158820, at *884
(11th Cir. Jan. 14, 2016).
273. Id. at *892.
274. Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 568--69 (6th Cir. 2004).
275. Id. at 578.
276. Id. at 572--73.
277. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79--80 (1998).
278. Seeid.
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not have drafted Title VII with plaintiffs like Chastity Jones in mind,
that does not mean that the courts cannot interpret the law to strike
down racially discriminatory grooming policies. 279
It is bizarre that the Eleventh Circuit found itself bound by the
definition of race at the time Title VII was enacted, when in recent
cases, the Supreme Court has expressly rejected narrow interpretations of national origin and sex. 280 The EEOC has even provided
guidance in the form of its Compliance Manual, that although not
binding on the courts, it is indeed helpful to resolving the issue of
what constitutes race. 281
While the issue of hair may seem trivial to some, for Black
women it is consequential, as choosing to wear one's hair naturally
can end up being a career liability. Being a Black woman in a space
where standards ofprofessionalism reinforce social hierarchies that
privilege whiteness is having to be constantly aware of how you fit
in and daily having to battle others' preconceptions about your
capabilities based on pervasive stereotypes about Black women
generally. To target black hairstyles in workplace grooming policies
is to correlate black culture with unprofessionalism and force Black
women to adopt more palatable alternatives in order to maintain
employment. And although employers have the right to enforce
dress codes, the practice of banning dreadlocks, braids, or any other
quintessentially black hairstyle, is unquestionably racist as there is
no existing evidence that these hairstyles run counter to the image
of a professional workplace.
Thus, in order to effectively combat racial discrimination in the
workplace, the courts must expand the margins of race for purposes of
Title VII to encompass traits beyond immutable characteristics, by
eliminating the immutability requirement altogether or at least applying it less stringently to include cultural aspects associated with race.
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